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Binocular rivalry (BR) occurs when the brain cannot fuse percepts from the two eyes
because they are different.We review results relating to an ongoing controversy regarding
the cortical site of the BR mechanism. Some BR qualities suggest it is low-level: (1) BR,
as its name implies, is usually between eyes and only low-levels have access to utrocular
information. (2) All input to one eye is suppressed: blurring doesn’t stimulate accommoda-
tion; pupilary constrictions are reduced; probe detection is reduced. (3) Rivalry is affected
by low-level attributes, contrast, spatial frequency, brightness, motion. (4) There is limited
priming due to suppressed words or pictures. On the other hand, recent studies favor a
high-levelmechanism: (1) Rivalry occurs between patterns, not eyes, as in patchwork rivalry
or a swapping paradigm. (2) Attention affects alternations. (3) Context affects dominance.
There is conﬂicting evidence from physiological studies (single cell and fMRI) regarding
cortical level(s) of conscious perception. We discuss the possibility of multiple BR sites
and theoretical considerations that rule out this solution. We present new data regarding
the locus of the BR switch by manipulating stimulus semantic content or high-level char-
acteristics. Since these variations are represented at higher cortical levels, their affecting
rivalry supports high-level BR intervention. In Experiment I, we measure rivalry when one
eye views words and the other non-words and ﬁnd signiﬁcantly longer dominance dura-
tions for non-words. In Experiment II, we ﬁnd longer dominance times for line drawings
of simple, structurally impossible ﬁgures than for similar, possible objects. In Experiment
III, we test the inﬂuence of idiomatic context on rivalry between words. Results show that
generally words within their idiomatic context have longer mean dominance durations.We
conclude that BR has high-level cortical inﬂuences, and may be controlled by a high-level
mechanism.
Keywords: binocular rivalry, cortical level, consciousness, perception, binocular, monocular, utrocular, semantics
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF CONFLICTING EVIDENCE
REGARDING SITE OF BINOCULAR RIVALRY
At any given moment our brains are busy with many tasks,
including: receiving sensory information, regulating autonomous
behavior, planning voluntary movements, and building mem-
ory of objects and events. Only some of these functions involve
consciousness, and we are unaware of most brain activity.
Binocular rivalry (BR)has theuniqueproperty that,while phys-
ical stimuli remain constant, subjective perception changes. While
two images are presented to the visual system and both are (at least
partially) processed, the observer is only aware of one. Thus, BR
is considered “perhaps the present most important experimental
approach to ﬁnding the neural correlate of consciousness” (NCC;
Crick and Koch, 1998). BR has been reviewed in more general
contexts (Tong, 2003; Blake and Wilson, 2011).
LEVELS OF PERCEPTUAL REPRESENTATION
It is well known that there is a hierarchy of visual information
processing (Hubel and Wiesel, 1962). Information from the eye
enters, via the thalamus, low cortical levels (V1, V2, etc.) where
simple features (such as lines of a speciﬁc orientation and loca-
tion) are represented. Feed-forward processing leads to categorical
representations, without details, at high cortical levels. Recent
work by Hochstein and Ahissar (2002) suggests that there may
be a reverse hierarchy of explicit visual perception. Visual infor-
mationﬁrst travels in the bottom-updirection,because input from
lower levels is necessary to construct a global representation, but
this process may be implicit, and unavailable to consciousness. It
was suggested that conscious perception begins with high-level
categorical representations of the global scene. According to this
reverse hierarchy theory (RHT), only later do we become aware
of scene details, by reverse hierarchy return to lower level smaller
receptive ﬁelds.
BINOCULAR RIVALRY
Binocular rivalry occurs when the brain cannot fuse the images
seen by the two eyes because they are two completely different
pictures or contain elements that differ in one or more fea-
tures or attributes such as: color, orientation, size, velocity of
motion, direction of motion, or depth (Blake and Logothetis,
2002). After an initial 150–200 ms, during which perception is of
the two views, superimposed (Wolfe, 1996), perception alternates
between two percepts. This alternation presumably reﬂects com-
petition between the images for conscious perception (Crick, 1996;
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Logothetis, 1998). Alternations continue about every 2–3 s, as long
as both stimuli are continuously viewed. Usually the two percepts
correspond to the stimuli in each eye separately. A histogram of
the time intervals (t ) that one of the stimuli is dominant is well ﬁt
by the gamma distribution (Fox and Hermann, 1967; Papathomas
et al., 1999; but see Rubin and Hupe, 2005) with two parameters
λ, r :
f (t ) = [λr/Γ(r)]t r−1 exp(−λt ) where
Γ(r) = (r − 1)! (for r positive integer)
To obtain ﬂuctuation of entire pictures (exclusive rather than
piecemeal rivalry), the stimuli must subtend no more than about
1 square degree for foveal targets (Blake et al., 1992; Kovács et al.,
1996). One eye’s view may be dominant more often or for longer
periods than that of the other, as occurs for ﬁgures that are
brighter, in higher contrast,moving, or of higher spatial frequency
(Levelt, 1965; Blake and Logothetis, 2002). It has been suggested
that strengthening one stimulus shortens its suppression dura-
tions without affecting its dominance times (Levelt, 1965; Fox and
Rasche, 1969). Finally, there is a long-standing debate (dating back
to Helmholtz and Hering) concerning the impact of voluntary
attention or cognitive salience on dominance times (see Ooi and
He, 1999; Meng and Tong, 2004; Chong et al., 2005; Paffen et al.,
2006; see also Toppino, 2003; van Ee et al., 2005).
LOCUS OF BINOCULAR RIVALRY
Related to the issue of voluntary control, there is ongoing con-
troversy regarding the low or high-level site of the BR mecha-
nism. Supporting evidence for low-level mechanisms, include the
following:
1. The fact that BR is usually a competition between monocular
images suggests that the competition takes place at low cortical
levels at or before the site of the transition from monocular
to binocular representation; higher level cortical areas do not
generally have utrocular information.
2. Basic stimulus attributes that are represented at low cortical
levels affect rivalry (see above; Levelt, 1965).
3. Suppression operates to “non-selectively weaken all inputs to
the suppressed eye,” which is “sufﬁcient to compromise, but
not abolish, visual performance” (Blake and Logothetis, 2002).
Suppression “erases” or “blocks” processing of stimuli to that
eye (perhaps similar to “early selection” in attention; Broad-
bent, 1958; Deutsch and Deutsch, 1963; Johnston and Heinz,
1979). Together with suppressing one eye’s image, detection of
a probe to that eye is also reduced; blurring the picture does not
stimulate the accommodation reﬂex; pupilary constrictions (in
response to light ﬂashes) are reduced in amplitude; and high-
level adaptation effects such as the global motion after effect are
reduced, though the tilt and local motion after effects remain
(Lehmkuhle and Fox,1975;Wade andWenderoth,1978;O’Shea
and Crassini, 1981; Blake et al., 2006).
4. There is no visual priming due to suppressed words or pictures
(Zimba and Blake, 1983), but priming with a certain direction
of motion during suppression can bias the direction seen in a
following ambiguous apparent motion sequence (Blake et al.,
1998; see also Hock et al., 1996).
5. Semantic content has not been found to inﬂuence probe
detection during rivalry suggesting that rivalry occurs before
semantic content is extracted (Blake, 1988). However, it was
recently found that a word related to a previously binocularly
primed word “comes out” of suppression faster (in a ﬂash-
suppression paradigm; Costello et al., 2009). See also the new
results presented later in this paper.
On the other hand, based on recent research, it seems that there
are also high-level effects in BR:
1. Attention. Voluntary attention to one stimulus may increase
its relative prominence, but not “save” it altogether from being
suppressed and pop-out cues to one eye (initiating involuntary
attention) can force a stimulus out of suppression (Ooi and He,
1999; Chong et al., 2005).
2. Patchwork rivalry. Kovács et al. (1996; see alsoAlais et al., 2000)
used novel stimuli where two pictures were divided between
the two eyes so that in order to see a coherent picture, infor-
mation from the two eyes had to be integrated. Indeed the
most prevalent percept was of coherent pictures, not of pic-
tures deriving from one eye, suggesting that rivalry is mainly
a high-level effect where competition is between integral per-
cepts. Lee and Blake (1999) reject this conclusion, claiming that
even low-level eye rivalry can be or patchy (as generally found
for large stimuli; Blake et al., 1992). Kovács et al. (1996; see
also Papathomas et al., 1999) would presumably respond that
the choice of pieces which form a coherent picture would have
to be high-level, proving at least a top-down inﬂuence on the
rivalry mechanism. In a recent paper, Lee and Blake (2004)
again challenge this interpretation, showing that swapping the
dominant image to the other eye causes the percept to change;
indicating that it was the eye that was dominant in that patch
and not the percept. In addition, a simulation of independent
regions of eye rivalry creates a dominance pattern that is similar
to patchwork rivalry, demonstrating that patchwork rivalry can
be explained without rejecting eye-based rivalry. Nevertheless,
these authors do not deny a top-down mechanism may play a
role in choosing the interocular grouping.
3. Context.Whenone of the rivaling stimuli is embedded in a con-
gruent (high-level) context, its dominant periods are shorter
(Carter et al., 2004) or longer (without a concomitant short-
ening of the suppression periods; Blake and Logothetis, 2002;
Sobel and Blake, 2002).
4. Global effects. Even for large targets where piecemeal rivalry
occurs, there are also periods of exclusive dominance (signiﬁ-
cantly more than chance), where the whole percept is monoc-
ular (Blake et al., 1992). Similarly, when small identical rival
targets are distributed throughout the visual ﬁeld they tend to
ﬂuctuate together.
5. Meaningful Content. A cognitively more salient stimulus, i.e.,
one with more “meaningful content,” remains dominant for
longer periods (Walker, 1978; e.g., an upright face: Engel, 1956
see also Zhou et al., 2010; an emotional face: Alpers and Gerdes,
2007; Bannerman et al., 2008; a recognizable ﬁgure: Yu and
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Blake, 1992; a familiar ﬁgure: Lo Sciuto and Hartley, 1963;
Goryo, 1969; Jiang et al., 2007). The implication of a high-
level mechanism has been questioned, however, because the
methods used for these studies were subjective, with a bias that
could have affected the response rather than the percept, and
because a low-level conﬁguration detection mechanism could
have affected both low-level rivalry and high-level meaning
comprehension (Yu and Blake, 1992; Blake, 2000).
6. Swapping. When gratings were rapidly swapped between the
eyes (at 1–3 Hz), observers report normal BR alternation rates
(0.3–0.5 Hz), indicating that the pattern, not the eye, was dom-
inant (pattern rivalry; Logothetis et al., 1996; van Boxtel et al.,
2008). Following this ﬁnding, Wilson (2003) models rivalry as
having both low-level and high-level mechanisms. However,
Lee and Blake (1999) suggest that rapid swapping may inter-
fere with “normal” rivalry mechanisms. More recent studies
show that there actually is some rapid eye-related alternation;
with the percentage of time that pattern rivalry is perceived
as opposed to eye rivalry depending on the coherence of the
stimuli (Bonneh et al., 2001; Silver and Logothetis, 2007).
7. Partial Rivalry. In an amazingly prescient paper, Treisman
(1962) found that when each eye was shown a different colored
circle (red/green) that was displaced relative to a surrounding
circle, observers experienced BR between the two colored cir-
cles, in depth. The disparity informationwas taken into account
even while the stimulus was suppressed. Superimposed orthog-
onal drifting gratings are perceived as a single plaid surface
moving in the direction of the vector sum of the two move-
ments. But when the two gratings are presented one to each
eye, rivalry ensues. For patches small enough to ensure exclu-
sive rivalry (0.8˚), only one grating is perceived at any moment
but it moves in the combined direction (Andrews and Blake-
more, 1999). For larger patches, too, when one experiences
piecemeal rivalry, the mosaic moves coherently, and again in
the combined direction (Andrews and Blakemore, 2002). Thus,
the suppressed (non-perceived) grating contributes to the per-
ceived direction of motion (see also Alais and Parker, 2006).
One may conclude that different neurons mediate rivalry of
different features (motion, contour, color).
8. Rubin (2003) suggested that alternations between percepts of
ambiguous ﬁgures have similar characteristics to BR alterna-
tions; (see also Carter and Pettigrew, 2003; van Ee, 2005; van
Boxtel et al., 2008). Since ambiguous ﬁgure alternations are
essentially between high-level interpretations, this similarity
suggests that BR, too, may depend on a high-level mechanism.
PHYSIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS
Physiological studies have also been used to ﬁnd the site of rivalry
alternation and the neural loci where activity corresponds to the
conscious percept rather than to the presence of a physical stimu-
lus. These investigators were often seeking hints at the site of the
NCC but their results may tell us where to look for the alterna-
tion mechanism. These studies used a number of methodologies,
including the following:
1. VEP. Using temporal tagging/labeling for two images pre-
sented to the two eyes, Brown and Norcia (1997) found
correspondence between activity in the occipital cortex and
perceptual changes. But this recording cannot separate between
different visual areas in the brain. Studies using MEG found
extended network responses modulated, but not extinguished
by rivalry (Tononi et al., 1998).
2. Single-cell recordings. Leopold and Logothetis (1996; see sum-
mary Logothetis, 1998) studied alert monkeys as they viewed
rivalry stimuli passively, or reported percept ﬂuctuations. The
dominance pattern was similar to that in humans. No evidence
was found for any inhibition in the Lateral Geniculate Nucleus.
Some of the neurons in striate cortex (20%) and early extras-
triate cortex (V4, MT; 40%) showed activity modulations that
corresponded to the perceptual changes, but not to the all-
or-none extent experienced perceptually. In inferior temporal
(IT) cortex, most of the neurons (90%) were active only when
their preferred stimulus was consciously perceived – i.e., as
reported by the monkey. Activity usually ceased when the pre-
ferred stimulus was suppressed, though some neurons acted in
the opposite manner. Thus, area IT seems to be located at or
beyond the point where the rivalry conﬂict is resolved.
3. Functional imaging. fMRI activity was measured in early visual
cortex while subjects viewed rivaling gratings of different con-
trasts (Polonsky et al., 2000). Activity in V1 increased when the
higher contrast was perceived and decreased when the lower
contrast was perceived. These ﬂuctuations were 55% as large as
when the gratings physically alternated. The same results were
found forV2,V3,V3a, andV4v. Tong et al. (1998) used pictures
of a face and a house, presented respectively to each of the two
eyes, and found modulations of brain activity in the Fusiform
Face Area and Posterior Parietal Area that coincided with the
ﬂuctuations in the reported percept and were equal in strength
to those reported when the stimuli were physically alternat-
ing, suggesting rivalry is resolved at or before these areas. It
is difﬁcult to resolve whether there is a build-up of rivalry
along the hierarchy or a high-level mechanism whose results
are fed back. More conclusively, Tong and Engel (2001) cleverly
measured responses in the blind spot which produces a monoc-
ular region of human V1 and found fMRI modulations during
rivalry which were as large as those evoked by physically alter-
nating stimuli, suggesting that rivalrymight be resolved by early
interocular competition.However, supporting the above single-
cell results, Brouwer et al. (2009) recently found intraparietal
sulcus (IPS) sensitivity to the degree of perceptual incongru-
ence of an ambiguous image, perhaps suggesting that this area
may play a role in signaling the need to reinterpret ambiguous
depth cues in the visual scene, initiating bistable perception.
Similarly, Kanai et al. (2010) recently found that individual BR
differences may depend on their different superior parietal lobe
activations.
4. TMS. Related to the above ﬁnding, Zaretskaya et al. (2010) used
TMS to individually disrupt processing in areas where fMRI
activity correlated with rivalry alternations. They found that
TMS over right IPS prolonged periods of stable percepts and
that the more lateralized the IPS blood oxygen level-dependent
signal, the more lateralized were the TMS effects. This sug-
gests a causal, destabilizing, and individually lateralized effect
of normal IPS function on perceptual continuity in rivalry,
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consistent with an IPS role in selection, related to its role in
attention.
5. Localized brain damage. While much has been learned in the
past from studies of deﬁcits following localized brain damage,
this avenue has not been utilized extensively for the study of BR.
One exception is the study by Valle-Inclán and Gallego (2006)
of a patient who hadmost of the prefrontal cortex disconnected
from the rest of the brain due to a bilateral frontal leuko-
tomy. Results indicated that prefrontal cortex is unnecessary
for perceptual alternations during BR.
SUMMARY
Thus, debate is still open regarding the locus of BR. A recently
suggested and commonly held “solution” to these opposing views
is that both high- and low-level mechanisms control rivalry, with
local stimuli inducing alternations at lower cortical sites and com-
plex conﬁgurations inducing high-level perceptual interpretations
at high cortical areas (Rubin, 2003; Wilson, 2003, 2005; Alais and
Blake, 2005; Rubin and Hupe, 2005; Tong et al., 2006). However,
there may be an essential problem with this solution. What deter-
mines if the low-level mechanism initiates rivalry? If it always
does, why don’t we see its impact in those cases that suggest a
high-level mechanism (patchwork rivalry, swapping, etc.)? And
why do high-level features (such as context) affect rivalry? On
the other hand, rapid access of partial information to high-level
areas before processing in early stages has been completed, may
explain such phenomena (see e.g., Rousselet et al., 2002). In addi-
tion, RHT (see above; Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002) predicts that
high-level mechanisms guide and feedback to low cortical levels,
so that (albeit pushing this argument to its extreme), high-level
attention (see Chong et al., 2005) may affect even a low-level
BR mechanism, or, alternatively – and more likely – a high-level
rivalry mechanism may have effects at lower levels.
Since complex images and scenes are represented as such at
higher cortical levels, we investigate in the following sections the
impact of varying high-level characteristics of the two eyes’ views,
and propose that if these variations affect rivalry, it would sup-
port high-level intervention in BR, i.e., a high-level mechanism
or at least a top-down effect in rivalry. We study BR with words
and compare dominance durations for words and non-words. The
only difference between these stimuli is high-level. Thus, any dif-
ference in rivalry pattern between words and non-words would
indicate a high-level mechanism.
DOMINANCE DURATIONS WHEN WORDS COMPETE WITH
NON-WORDS
INTRODUCTION AND METHODS
We study rivalry between words and non-words (i.e., strings of
letters without meaning, or pronounceable nonsense words) to
investigate whether high-level semantic meaning affects the time
spent with each type of input.
Subjects were 11 university students (age 19–35, mean 24),
naïve to the purpose of the experiment, remunerated for partic-
ipation, tested for normal or corrected-to-normal vision in both
eyes, with good stereovision and no strabismus.
Stimuli were superimposed semitransparent 4˚× 4˚ diagonal
texts, one in green and one in red, viewed through red/green ﬁlter
glasses so that the stimuli were seen as equally salient black and
each eye saw one text, as demonstrated in Figure 1. A black frame
and black ﬁxation cross, seen by both eyes, promoted fusion.View-
ing distance was 57 cm. Texts were in Hebrew, the main language
of the subjects. In our presentations, as is general in Hebrew, vow-
els are assumed and not explicitly written, and non-words are
usually pronounceable. Words (44 in all) were common (aver-
age 0.2/thousand) short (3.2 letters), nouns (59%), verbs (11%),
and simple adjectives (25%) with few cases of polysemy (9%) or
homography (11%). Non-words were created using the same let-
ters as the words. Since Hebrew words depend on a 3-letter root,
changing letter order creates a totally new – and usually unrecog-
nizable – non-word. Words were in print font and non-words in
script (or vice versa), allowing responses without explicit reference
to text meaningfulness. Stimuli were counterbalanced between
print and script font and between red and green color. Words
(and non-words) were not repeated within trials.
Subjects were asked to maintain ﬁxation throughout the trial,
and initiated trials by pressing the space-bar. There were 24 tri-
als/session, each of 90 s during which the stimulus did not change.
Subjects reported perceptual changes by brieﬂy pressing one of
three keys: PRINT (the “p” key), SCRIPT (“i”), or MIXED (“o”;
subjects were instructed to indicate PRINT or SCRIPT as long as
the stimulus was predominantly such).
RESULTS
The mean dominance time for non-words was longer than for
words, 3.03± 0.08 vs. 2.58± 0.06 s; p < 0.0001 (unpaired two-
tailed t -test); dominance times for print and script were not
signiﬁcantly different: 2.78 ± 0.06 vs. 2.83± 0.07 s; p = 0.6, as
demonstrated inFigure 2. Furthermore, for each subject, themean
dominance time was longer for non-words than for words (or in
two cases nearly identical), as shown in the scatter plot of Figure 3
comparing average dominance times for each of the 11 subjects.
Nearly all points lie above the diagonal of equality. Across-subject
mean is 4.5± 1 vs. 3.7± 0.9 s; p < 0.02 (paired two-tailed t -test).
Comparing these word-non-word competition data with domi-
nance times for words presented to both eyes and for non-words
presented to both eyes, we found an indication for competition
FIGURE 1 | Examples of word-non-word rivaling stimuli. Left English
text (rain snow sun wind vs. unss ond awin wrin – pronounceable
non-words); Right Hebrew text – as actually used in Experiment 1, since
subjects were Hebrew speakers; text in print vs. script font.
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leading to shortening of dominance times for words, rather than
lengthening for non-words.
DOMINANCE DURATIONS WHEN POSSIBLE FIGURES
COMPETE WITH IMPOSSIBLE FIGURES
INTRODUCTION AND METHODS
Having found a difference between dominance times for non-
words vs. words, we asked if this difference might be more general,
extending to other images beyond those of written words, in par-
ticular real, structurally possible ﬁgures compared with impossible
ﬁgures. This would be consistent with previous ﬁndings that dis-
pleasing stimuli have an advantage over pleasing images (Smets,
1975).
Methods were as above, with two quite similar line drawings
superimposed, one possible and one impossible, one in red and
one in green, as demonstrated in Figure 4. Trials lasted 60 s, 20/ses-
sion, 17 subjects (age 20–36; mean 25) reported their percept
by pressing one of two keys (e.g., “j” for triangle pointing up;
FIGURE 2 | Dominance durations. Mean dominance duration for
non-words is greater than for words; no difference between print and script
font. Pooled results for all subjects.
FIGURE 3 | Scatter plot showing mean dominance durations of
non-words vs. words for each subject. All points are on or above the
equivalence line: mean dominance durations for non-words were longer
than for words. Note one observer had considerably longer dominance
durations, plotted on an extended scale.
“f” for pointing down). We used two kinds of pictures: “simple”
including: forks (possible and impossible), triangles (possible 3-D
triangle and Penrose triangle; Draper, 1978), and squares (possible
3-D vs. Penrose-like square); and “complex” including Esher-type
drawings (Thro, 1983) and similar possible objects: houses, win-
dowpanes, wheels, and cubes. In each trial, both pictures were
either simple or complex.
RESULTS
For simple ﬁgures, impossible ﬁgures were dominant for longer
times. Mean dominance durations for impossible and possible
ﬁgures were 2.8± 0.2 vs. 2.5± 0.2 s; p < 0.02 (paired two-tail
t -test), as shown in Figures 5 and 6. On the other hand, for com-
plex ﬁgures, dominance times were considerably longer, with no
FIGURE 4 | Examples of stimuli used for possible vs. impossible
figures. Simple and complex ﬁgures (top and bottom row, respectively)
were used. Subjects viewed pictures through red/green ﬁltered glasses.
FIGURE 5 | Dominance durations – possible vs. impossible figures.
Across-subject mean dominance durations for possible and impossible
ﬁgures for the different classes of images. Simple impossible ﬁgures have
longer dominance durations than possible ﬁgures, with no difference for
complex ﬁgures.
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difference between ﬁgures: 3.4 ± 0.3 vs. 3.4± 0.4 s; p = 0.93. These
results are conﬁrmed in the scatter plots of Figure 6, where the
points for the simple impossible ﬁgures fall above the diagonal
line of equivalence, but not the points for the complex ﬁgures.
A possible explanation for this difference is that with simple
ﬁgures, impossible ones are more intriguing, but for complex
ﬁgures, even the possible ﬁgures were complicated enough that
they were as interesting as the impossible ﬁgures, and/or their
dominance times reached some ceiling of dominance time. Pre-
vious studies showed that processing structurally possible and
impossible ﬁgures takes place at high-level cortical regions (Schac-
ter et al., 1995) and that only these levels may be used for
differentiating percepts of possible vs. impossible objects.
EFFECT OF IDIOMATIC CONTEXT ON DOMINANCE DURATION
INTRODUCTION AND METHODS
Having found that semantic content affects BR dominance, we
tested semantic context. Will words imbedded in a congruent con-
text be more salient than words incongruent with that context,
increasing the dominance times? Perhaps while nonsense words
attract more – longer – attention due to the variety of ways they
may be read (so that subjects may be experimenting with them
(consciously or unconsciously) trying to ﬁgure out a meaningful
way to pronounce them, words out-of-context are easily read and
FIGURE 6 | Mean dominance duration scatter plots by subject for
simple (top) and complex (bottom) figures. For simple ﬁgures, most
points are above the equality line indicating longer dominance durations for
impossible ﬁgures. For complex ﬁgures, points are mostly close to the
equality line.
their nonsense context easily rejected, so that perhaps no extra
time will be spent with incongruent texts. Context effects have
been tested for low-level stimuli (e.g., Sobel andBlake,2002;Carter
et al., 2004), but what about high-level context? What constitutes
congruent context for words?We used well known short (Hebrew)
idioms.
Stimuli were constructed so that with colored stimuli and
glasses (as above) one eye viewed a well known short idiom and
the other a modiﬁed idiom where one word was replaced with
a different word (chosen to ﬁt grammatically and to have an
equal frequency in Hebrew; see http://word-freq.mscc.huji.ac.il/
index.html). For example, idiom: Mipnay seiva takum (transla-
tion: Rise for the elderly); modiﬁed idiom: Mipnay hakara takum
(translation: Rise for the frost); (Similar to idiom: a stitch in time
saves nine; modiﬁed “idiom”: a stitch in time waits nine).
Stimulus size was 3.5× 3.5 cm viewed at 76 cm. See example
in Figure 7. Trials lasted 60 s. Subjects tracked their percept by
pressing one of three keys, “print,”“script,” or “mixed.” They were
asked to adopt a constant criterion and, press “print” or “script”
even if the percept was not exclusively so.
RESULTS
Real idioms were dominant for longer periods than modiﬁed texts.
Words in-context had greater predominance than words not-in-
context. Figure 8 shows mean dominance durations for individual
subjects, and across-subject means for the two conditions. For
almost all observers, mean dominance duration in-context was
longer than when not-in-context; mean in-context 5.3± 0.5 s;
out-of-context 4.7± 0.4 s; p < 0.01, paired t -test.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We found a series of high-level effects in BR. The only difference
between the stimuli presented to the two eyes was their cognitive
semantic content. Nevertheless, there was a signiﬁcant difference
in the dominance periods of the two images.
In the context of the issue of the low or high cortical level
of the mechanism controlling BR, these stimuli differed only in
semantic content so that a low-level mechanism would treat them
FIGURE 7 | Example of stimulus for Experiment 3. Note that the idiom is
in script font, the non-idiom in print.
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FIGURE 8 | Mean dominance durations of in-context vs. out-of-context
idiom texts, for each subject (filled diamonds) and across-subject
means (open diamond). In-context dominance duration is generally longer
than out-of-context duration.
equally, while, at higher cortical levels, one could be preferred.
In each pair, one stimulus was a group of possible words and the
other impossible words composed of the same letters (Experiment
1), one was a structurally possible ﬁgure and the other impossi-
ble (Experiment 2), or one was a proper idiom and the other an
idiom with a non-appropriate word interjected (Experiment 3).
If the mechanism controlling BR were low-level, there should be
no difference between non-words and words, between possible
and impossible ﬁgures, or between words in- or out-of-context
and we should ﬁnd balanced rivalry (as with horizontal vs. verti-
cal gratings). On the other hand, a high-level mechanism would
be expected to distinguish between the two, and favor the more
“interesting” image.
In fact, an effect in either direction would have indicated a
high-level effect. We actually expected words to predominate over
non-words and objects over non-objects, due to their being more
familiar, containing meaning, and perhaps a “better unit” object
or word in the Gestalt sense. Surprisingly, the results indicate
otherwise. Non-words and impossible objects seem to be more
interesting and attract longer scrutiny (see also Bonneh et al.,
2001; Mudrik et al., 2011). Importantly, these results indicate that
high-level interest overpowers more simple and direct familiarity.
Previous studies that attempted to differentiate between low-
and high-level rivalry mechanisms (reviewed in Introduction
and Review of Conﬂicting Evidence Regarding Site of Binocular
Rivalry) used binocular effects such as patchwork images (Kovács
et al., 1996) or ﬂicker and switch stimuli (Logothetis et al., 1996)
to demonstrate non-eye-related percepts and high-level image-
related percepts. Others looked for manipulations that inﬂuence
rivalry dominance times, such as contrast or context. Contrast
would seem to indicate a low-level mechanism, context a high-
level one.We now add a new approach,using high-level differences
between stimuli and their impact on rivalry dominance times to
demonstrate that these, too, depend on high-level effects.
The indication of a shortening of the dominance times for
words when competing with non-words coincides with Levelt’s
famous second law that the more salient stimulus has longer dom-
inance times because of the shortening of its suppression times.
While extension of non-word dominance durations could derive
from an attentional effect, shortening of non-word suppression
periods more deﬁnitively suggests a high-level BR control mech-
anism1. Similar results were found by Ooi and He (1999) who
manipulated attention during BR and by van Ee et al. (2007) who
found a dominance dependence on simultaneous auditory stimuli.
In addition, Sobel and Blake (2002) and Carter et al. (2004) found
that the context surrounding simple rivalrous stimuli affects their
dominance phases. The results of these authors, demonstrating
an attentional or contextual involvement in rivalry, also support
high-level control of dominance times.Our ownnew results, taken
together with those of these prior studies, provide substantial sup-
port for the conclusion that rivalry is controlled or at least affected
by high-level mechanisms.
Though we may not have solved the entire mystery of which
part of the brain is responsible for the switching in BR, we have
demonstrated a new set of stimuli for which onemay be easily con-
vinced that it is a high-level mechanism that decides which stim-
ulus is dominant. This ﬁnding is consistent with RHT (Hochstein
and Ahissar, 2002), which suggests that high cortical level effects
are the ﬁrst to enter conscious perception. Thus, a switchingmech-
anism located here will have rapid effects on perception and then
gradually travel down the hierarchy – in reverse order – affecting
lower cortical level responses as well.
1We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this line of reasoning.
REFERENCES
Alais,D., and Blake,R. (2005). Binocular
Rivalry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Alais, D., O’Shea, R. P., Mesana-Alais,
C., and Wilson, G. (2000). On
binocular alternation. Perception 29,
1437–1445.
Alais, D., and Parker, A. (2006). Inde-
pendent binocular rivalry processes
for motion and form. Neuron 52,
911–920.
Alpers, G. W., and Gerdes, A. B. M.
(2007). Here is looking at you: emo-
tional faces predominate in binocu-
lar rivalry. Emotion 3, 495–506.
Andrews, T. J., and Blakemore, C.
(1999). Form and motion have
access to consciousness. Nat. Neu-
rosci. 2, 405–406.
Andrews, T. J., and Blakemore, C.
(2002). Integration of motion infor-
mation during binocular rivalry.
Vision Res.42, 301–309.
Bannerman, R. L., Milders, M., De
Gelder, B., and Sahraie, A. (2008).
Inﬂuence of emotional facial expres-
sions on binocular rivalry. Oph-
thalmic Physiol. Opt. 28, 317–326.
Blake, R. (1988). Dichoptic reading: the
role of meaning in binocular rivalry.
Percept. Psychophys. 44, 133–141.
Blake, R. (2000). A primer on binocular
rivalry, including current controver-
sies. Brain Mind 2, 5–38.
Blake, R., and Logothetis, N. K. (2002).
Visual competition. Nat. Rev. Neu-
rosci. 3, 1–11.
Blake, R., O’Shea, R. P., and Mueller,
T. J. (1992). Spatial zones of
binocular rivalry in central and
peripheral vision. Vis. Neurosci. 8,
469–478.
Blake, R., Tadin, D., Sobel, K., Raiss-
ian, T., and Chong, S. C. (2006).
Strength of visual adaptation
depends on visual awareness.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 103,
4783–4788.
Blake, R., and Wilson, H. (2011).
Binocular vision. Vision Res. 51,
754–770.
Blake, R., Yu, K., Lokey, M., and Nor-
man, H. (1998). Binocular rivalry
and motion perception. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 10, 46–60.
Bonneh, Y., Sagi, D., and Karni, A.
(2001). A transition between eye
and object rivalry determined by
stimulus coherence. Vision Res. 41,
981–989.
Broadbent, D. E. (1958). Perception and
Communication. Oxford: Pergamon.
Brouwer, G. J., Tong, F., Hagoort, P.,
and van Ee, R. (2009). Percep-
tual incongruence inﬂuences bista-
bility and cortical activation. PLoS
ONE 4, e5056. doi:10.1371/jour-
nal.pone.0005056
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 129 | 7
Wolf and Hochstein High-level binocular rivalry effects
Brown, R. J., and Norcia, A. M. (1997).
A method for investigating binoc-
ular rivalry in real time with the
steady-state VEP. Vision Res. 37,
2401–2408.
Carter, O. L., Campbell, T. G., Liu,
G. B., and Wallis, G. (2004).
Contradictory inﬂuence of context
on predominance during binocu-
lar rivalry. Clin. Exp. Optom. 87,
153–162.
Carter, O. L., and Pettigrew, J. D. (2003).
A common oscillator for perceptual
rivalries? Perception 32, 295–305.
Chong, S. C., Tadin, D., and Blake,
R. (2005). Endogenous attention
prolongs dominance durations
in binocular rivalry. J. Vis. 5,
1004–1012.
Costello, P., Jiang, Y., Baartman, B.,
McGlennen, K., and He, S. (2009).
Semantic and subword priming dur-
ing binocular suppression. Con-
scious. Cogn. 18, 375–382.
Crick, F. (1996). Visual perception:
rivalry and consciousness. Nature
379, 485–486.
Crick, F., and Koch, C. (1998). Con-
sciousness and neuroscience. Cereb.
Cortex 8, 97–107.
Deutsch, J. A., and Deutsch, D. (1963).
Attention: some theoretical consid-
erations. Psychol. Rev. 70, 80–90.
Draper, S. W. (1978). The Penrose tri-
angle and a family of related ﬁgures.
Perception 7, 283–296.
Engel, E. (1956). The role of content in
binocular resolution. Am. J. Psychol.
69, 87–91.
Fox, R., and Hermann, J. (1967).
Stochastic properties of binocular
rivalry alternations. Percept. Psy-
chophys. 2, 432–436.
Fox, R., and Rasche, F. (1969). Binocu-
lar rivalry and reciprocal inhibition.
Percept. Psychophys. 5, 215–217.
Goryo, K. (1969). The effect of
past experience upon the binocular
rivalry. Jpn. Psychol. Res. 11, 46–53.
Hochstein, S., and Ahissar, M. (2002).
View from the top: hierar-
chies and reverse hierarchies in
the visual system. Neuron 36,
791–804.
Hock,H. S., Schöner,G., and Hochstein,
S. (1996). Perceptual stability and
the selective adaptation of perceived
and unperceived motion directions.
Vision Res. 36, 3311–3323.
Hubel, D. H., and Wiesel, T. N. (1962).
Receptive ﬁelds, binocular interac-
tion and functional architecture in
the cat’s visual cortex. J. Physiol. 160,
106–154.
Jiang, Y., Costello, P., and He, S.
(2007). Processing of invisible stim-
uli: advantage of upright faces and
recognizable words in overcoming
interocular suppression. Psychol. Sci.
18, 349–355.
Johnston,W. A., and Heinz, S. P. (1979).
Depth of nontarget processing in an
attention task. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 5, 168–175.
Kanai, R., Bahrami, B., and Rees,
G. (2010). Human parietal cortex
structure predicts individual differ-
ences in perceptual rivalry. Curr.
Biol. 20, 1626–1630.
Kovács, I., Papathomas, T. V., Yang,
M., and Feher, A. (1996). When
the brain changes its mind: inte-
rocular grouping during binocular
rivalry. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
93, 15508–15511.
Lee, S. H., and Blake, R. (1999). Rival
ideas about rivalry. Vision Res. 39,
1447–1454.
Lee, S. H., and Blake, R. (2004). A fresh
look at interocular grouping dur-
ing binocular rivalry. Vision Res. 44,
983–991.
Lehmkuhle, S., and Fox, R. (1975).
Effect of binocular rivalry suppres-
sion on the motion after effect.
Vision Res. 15, 855–859.
Leopold, D. A., and Logothetis, N.
K. (1996). Activity changes in
early visual cortex reﬂect monkeys’
percepts during binocular rivalry.
Nature 379, 549–553.
Levelt, W. J. M. (1965). On Binocular
Rivalry Soesterberg, The Nether-
lands: Institute for Perception
RVOTNO.
Lo Sciuto, L. A., and Hartley, E.
L. (1963). Religious afﬁliation and
open-mindedness in binocular res-
olution. Percept. Mot. Skills 17,
427–430.
Logothetis, N. K. (1998). Single units
and conscious vision. Philos. Trans.
R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 353,
1801–1818.
Logothetis, N. K., Leopold, D. A., and
Sheinberg, D. L. (1996). What is
rivaling during binocular rivalry?
Nature 380, 621–624.
Meng, M., and Tong, F. (2004). Can
attention selectively bias bistable
perception? Differences between
binocular rivalry and ambiguous
ﬁgures. J. Vis. 4, 539–551.
Mudrik, L., Deouell, L. Y., and Lamy,
D. (2011). Scene congruency biases
binocular rivalry. Conscious. Cogn.
20, 756–767.
Ooi, T. L., and He, Z. J. (1999). Binoc-
ular rivalry and visual awareness:
the role of attention. Perception 28,
551–574.
O’Shea, R. P., and Crassini, B. (1981).
Interocular transfer of the motion
after-effect is not reduced by
binocular rivalry. Vision Res. 21,
801–804.
Paffen, C. L., Alais, D., and Verstraten,
F. A. (2006). Attention speeds
binocular rivalry. Psychol. Sci. 17,
752–756.
Papathomas, T. V., Kovacs, I., Feher, A.,
and Julezs, B. (1999). “Visual dilem-
mas: competition between eyes
and between percepts in binocular
rivalry,” in What is Cognitive Sci-
ence? eds E. Lepore and Z. Pylyshyn
(Malden,MA: Blackwell Publishers),
263–294.
Polonsky, A., Blake, R., Braun, J.,
and Heeger, D. J. (2000). Neuronal
activity in human primary cortex
correlates with perception during
binocular rivalry. Nat. Neurosci. 3,
1153–1159.
Rousselet, G. A., Fabre-Thorpe, M., and
Thorpe, S. J. (2002). Parallel pro-
cessing in high-level categorization
of natural images. Nat. Neurosci. 5,
629–630.
Rubin, N. (2003). Binocular rivalry and
perceptual multi-stability. Trends
Neurosci. 26, 289–291.
Rubin, N., and Hupe, J. M. (2005).
“Dynamics of perceptual bista-
bility: plaids and binocular
rivalry compared,” in Binocular
Rivalry, eds D. Alais and R. Blake
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press),
138–154.
Schacter, D. L., Reiman, E., Uecker, A.,
Polster,M. R.,Yun, L. S., and Cooper,
L. A. (1995). Brain regions associ-
ated with retrieval of structurally
coherent visual information. Nature
376, 587–590.
Silver, M. A., and Logothetis, N. K.
(2007). Temporal frequency and
contrast tagging bias the type of
competition in interocular switch
rivalry. Vision Res. 47, 532–543.
Smets, G. (1975). Pleasingness vs. inter-
estingness of visual stimuliwith con-
trolled complexity: their relation-
ship to looking time as a function
of exposure time. Percept. Mot. Skills
40, 3–7.
Sobel, K. V., and Blake, R. (2002).
How context inﬂuences predomi-
nance during binocular rivalry. Per-
ception 31, 813–824.
Thro, E. B. (1983). Distinguishing two
classes of impossible objects. Percep-
tion 12, 733–751.
Tong, F. (2003). Primary visual cor-
tex and visual awareness. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 4, 219–229.
Tong, F., and Engel, S. A. (2001).
Interocular rivalry revealed in the
human cortical blind-spot represen-
tation. Nature 411, 195–199.
Tong, F.,Meng,M., and Blake,R. (2006).
Neural bases of binocular rivalry.
Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 10,
502–511.
Tong, F., Nakayama, K., Vaughan, J. T.,
and Kanwisher, N. (1998). Binocu-
lar rivalry and visual awareness in
human extrastriate cortex. Neuron
21, 753–759.
Tononi, G., Srinivasan, R., Russell, D.
P., and Edelman, G. M. (1998).
Investigating neural correlates of
conscious perception by frequency-
tagged neuromagnetic responses.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 95,
3198–3203.
Toppino, T. C. (2003). Reversible-ﬁgure
perception: mechanisms of inten-
tional control. Percept. Psychophys.
65, 1285–1295.
Treisman, A. (1962). Binocular rivalry
and stereoscopic depth perception.
Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 14, 23–37.
Valle-Inclán, F., and Gallego, E. (2006).
Bilateral frontal leucotomy does not
alter perceptual alternation during
binocular rivalry. Prog. Brain Res.
155, 235–239.
van Boxtel, J. J., Knapen, T., Erke-
lens, C. J., and van Ee, R. (2008).
Removal of monocular interactions
equates rivalry behavior for monoc-
ular, binocular, and stimulus rival-
ries. J. Vis. 8, 13.1–13.17.
van Ee, R. (2005). Dynamics of
perceptual bi-stability for stereo-
scopic slant rivalry and a compar-
ison with grating, house-face, and
Necker cube rivalry. Vision Res. 45,
29–40.
van Ee, R., Parker, A. L., van Boxtel, J.
J., and Alais, D. M. (2007). Volun-
tary control over visual rivalry can be
enhanced by sound that is consistent
with scene interpretation. Perception
36, S57.
van Ee, R., van Dam, L. C., and
Brouwer, G. J. (2005). Voluntary
control and the dynamics of per-
ceptual bi-stability. Vision Res. 45,
41–55.
Wade, N. J., and Wenderoth, P. (1978).
The inﬂuence of colour and contour
rivalry on the magnitude of the tilt
after effect. Vision Res. 18, 827–835.
Walker, P. (1978). Orientation-selective
inhibition andbinocular rivalry.Per-
ception 7, 207–214.
Wilson, H. R. (2003). Computational
evidence for a rivalry hierarchy.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 100,
14499–144503.
Wilson, H. R. (2005). “Rivalry and
perceptual oscillations: a dynamical
synthesis,” in Binocular Rivalry, eds
D. Alais and R. Blake (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press), 317–335.
Wolfe, J. M. (1996). Resolving visual
ambiguity. Nature 380, 587–588.
Yu, K., and Blake, R. (1992). Do rec-
ognizable ﬁgures enjoy an advan-
tage in binocular rivalry. J. Exp.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 129 | 8
Wolf and Hochstein High-level binocular rivalry effects
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 18,
1158–1173.
Zaretskaya, N., Thielscher, A., Logo-
thetis, N. K., and Bartels, A.
(2010). Disrupting parietal func-
tion prolongs dominance durations
in binocular rivalry. Curr. Biol. 20,
2106–2111.
Zhou, G., Zhanga, L., Liub, J., Yangc,
J., and Qu, Z. (2010). Speciﬁcity of
face processing without awareness.
Conscious. Cogn. 19, 408–412.
Zimba, L., and Blake,R. (1983). Binocu-
lar rivalry and semantic processing:
out of sight, out of mind. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 9,
807–815.
Conﬂict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any
commercial or ﬁnancial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conﬂict of interest.
Received: 29 June 2011; accepted: 17
October 2011; published online: 01
December 2011.
Citation: Wolf M and Hochstein S
(2011) High-level binocular rivalry
effects. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 5:129. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2011.00129
Copyright © 2011 Wolf and Hochstein.
This is an open-access article subject
to a non-exclusive license between the
authors and Frontiers Media SA, which
permits use, distribution and reproduc-
tion in other forums, provided the original
authors and source are credited and other
Frontiers conditions are complied with.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 129 | 9
